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Symposium

I

Reifying Law-Rule of Law, Government,
the State, and Transnational Governance
Introduction
Larry Catai Backer*
The idea for this symposium grew out of a problem that has become
more acute in the discourse of contemporary globalization: what are the
basic assumptions from which regulatory systems are elaborated?
Globalization may be shaking the foundations of contemporary systems,
centered on a hierarchy of power in which the political community,
organized as states, stood at the top. Government may both have a
monopoly on formal lawmaking, yet official lawmaking may no longer
describe the extent of formal governance in a world in which States no
longer necessarily sit at the top of the pyramid of recognized power
relationships and contract may serve as law in a new form.' Law,
* Visiting Professor of Law, Tulane Law School; Professor of Law, The Dickinson
School of Law of the Pennsylvania State University; Director, Coalition for Peace &
Ethics. The author may be contacted at lcb91 I@gmail.com. My thanks to the staff of
the Penn State InternationalLaw Review for their help, encouragement and support in
seeing this symposium through from conception through execution. The staff has proven
critical to the realization of this project. I am especially grateful to Laura Ashley Martin,
Matthew Cronin, Jason Reimer and Daniel F. Olejko.
1. See Yuval Shany, Notes and Comments: Contract Claims Versus Treaty Claims:
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government, the State, the community of States, and the individual
(natural and juridical) serve as the basic building blocks of contemporary
communal orders. Each is a set of animating ideas that used to be
confined to notions of constitutionalism once confined to the territory of
23
states,' and is now
important beyond the state. 3 But each is also a set of
methodologies through which that idea becomes manifested in
communities of individuals. Yet the meaning of these terms has proven
elusive, either as ideas or as manifestations of ideas. Equally elusive is
the way each of those building blocks of communal order interacts with
each other in a world of people and not of ideas, though a world in which
ideas can be felt as fatally as concrete falling from a scaffold. Most
elusive, perhaps, is the way in which law (understood broadly) is judged
good (legitimate, authoritative, civilized, and the like) or bad
(illegitimate, arbitrary, savage, and the like).5
Within this complex of concepts and manifestations, law appears
always to have a primary place. Despite this conceptual dynamism, the
last century has been consistent in its desire to be "ruled" by law as the
basic parameter of the construction of systems of government, states,
communities of states and individuals. "Rule of law" both as a set of
normative principles and as methods of governance, has assumed
important institutional global dimensions since the establishment of the
contemporary world order after 1945. As a set of normative principles,
"rule of law" has exploded from an understanding of the relationship of
law, government, and the individuals who act in the name of either
within political States to a search for a universal set of principles that
govern the constitution of States. 7 "Rule of law" is now said to serve an
Mapping Conflicts Between ICSID Decisions on Multisourced Investment Claims, 99
AM. J. INT'L L. 835 (2005).
2. See, e.g., A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF LAW OF THE
CONSTITUTION 107-23 (Liberty Classics 1982) (1885).

3. See Thomas Carothers, The Rule of Law Revival, FOREIGN AFT. (Mar.-Apr.
1998), at 95-96.
4. See Harold Honhju Koh, Luncheon Address, reprinted in The American Law
Institute Remarks and Addresses at the 83 d Annual Meeting, 83 A.L.I. PROC. 70 (May 17,
2006), at 65-89.
5.

Compare WESTEL W. WILLOUGHBY, THE FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF PUBLIC

LAW 29-31, 35-39, 312-15 (New York, Macmillan 1924) (traditional value judgments
before 1945) with Sigmund Timburg, InternationalCombines and National Sovereigns,
95 U. PA L. REv. 575, 577 (1947) and Thomas Buergenthal, The Evolving International
Human Rights System, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 783 (2006).
6. See Spencer Zifcak, Globalizing the Rule of Law: Rethinking Values and
Reforming Institutions, in GLOBALISATION AND THE RULE OF LAW 32-65 (Spencer Zifcak
ed., 2005).
7. See Larry Catd Backer, God(s) Over Constitutions: International and Religious
TransnationalConstitutionalism in the 21" Century, 26 MISS. C. L. REV. (forthcoming
2007); Walter F. Murphy, Constitutions, Constitutionalism, and Democracy, in
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ideology of constitutionalism. 8 But it is also central to the methodologies
of the construction of "legitimate" government-that is a government
with respect to which there is no just reason against which to rebel. 9
These legitimacy principles can be reduced to methods of constructing a
legal state:
"[1] the predominance of regular law so that the government has no
arbitrary authority over the citizen... [2] all citizens are equally
subject to the ordinary law administered by the ordinary courts...
[3] the citizen's personal freedoms are formulated and protected by
the ordinary law ....10
The focus is on the translation of principle to lived reality among the
people most directly affected. Rule of law, as concept and method, has
become a concern of States whatever their foundational ideology,11 and
has become part of the discourse of the behavior of non-governmental
entities, especially multinational corporations. 12 And, its principles have
begun to seep into the construction of hard and soft systems of
international law, governance and behavior. 13 Contract regimes overseen
by supra-national entities may engage the same rule of law issues, as
325 (Douglas Greenberg et al. eds., 1993).
8. See Louis Henkin, A New Birth Of Constitutionalism:Genetic Influences And
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY: TRANSITIONS IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD

Genetic Defects, in
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IDENTITY,

DIFFERENCE,

AND LEGITIMACY

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES (Michel Rosenfeld ed., London, Duke U. Press Durham
1994). On its application in context, see, e.g., Herman Schwartz, Building Blocks for a
ISSUES OF DEMOCRACY: CONSTITUTIONALISM AND EMERGING
DEMOCRACIES (Mar. 2004). For a critique of constitutionalism as ideology, see EDWARD
MCWHINNEY, CONSTITUTION-MAKING: PRINCIPLES, PROCESS, PRACTICE (U. of Toronto
Constitution, 9(1)

Press 1981).
9. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 41 (Harvard U.
Press 2001) (political power is legitimate only when it is exercised in accordance with a
constitution (written or unwritten), the essentials of which all citizens, as reasonable and
rational, can endorse in the light of their common human reason. This is the liberal
principle of legitimacy). See also Michel Rosenfeld, The Rule of Law and the Legitimacy
of ConstitutionalDemocracy, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1307 (2001).
10. ANWAR IBRAHIM, THE ASIAN RENAISSANCE 63 (Singapore, Times Editions
1996); see also Randall Peeremboom, Varieties of Rule of Law: An Introduction and
ProvisionalConclusion, in THEORIES AND IMPLEMENTATION OF RULE OF LAW IN TWELVE
ASIAN COUNTRIES, FRANCE AND THE U.S. 1, 4 (Randall Peerenboom ed., 2004).

11. See Larry Catfi Backer, The Rule of Law, The Chinese Communist Party, and
Ideological Campaigns: Sange Daibiao(the "Three Represents'), Socialist Rule of Law,
and Modern Chinese Constitutionalism, 16(1) J. TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 29
(2006).
12. See Larry CatA Backer, Multinational Corporations, Transnational Law: The
United Nation's Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations as a
Harbinger of Corporate Social Responsibility as InternationalLaw, 37 COLUM. HUM.
RTs. L. REV. 287 (2006).
13. See THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS
(1997).

PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:3

founding or legitimating ideologies, as traditional nation states. 14
Still, for all the agreement about the rule of law, the essential ideas
and constructions remain highly contested. Law is either something
inherent in communities of people or can spring only from an assertion
of their will. That assertion of will might be manifested by societal
action or only through the apparatus of government. That government
might represent the entire sovereign capacity of the people or merely
serve as a fiduciary of that power. The sovereign capacity of a people
might be unlimited or it might be exercised only within the constraints of
rules to which all peoples are subject. All peoples may be subject to
global and thus universal constraints, or to the universal constraints of a
divinely ordained system. Law, may, indeed, be limited to rules
applicable to the establishment of political communities, or systems of
such communities, but not of non-political systems. Or, law may be
understood as an expression by any group through action or conscious
design. Depending on the basic assumptions embraced (about how law
"works"), the resulting ideas, jurisprudence and conceptual limits of
discourse about law, communities, government, and individuals, follow.
But, what follows is neither inevitable nor indisputable from out of
reason, rather than from a faith in the "truth" of the core assumptions
embraced.
Understood in its contemporary form as a debate about "rule of
law," the roots of this debate about the meaning and practice of law,
government, State, and public officials are ancient. Its political, social
and religious expressions are bound up in Bracton's notions of
gubernaculum (government) and jurisdictio (jurisdiction), 15 which
together define the character, scope and authority of coercive systems of
governance, both public and private. And Bracton is a useful beginning
for a consideration of the problem. He stands at the beginning of the
transformation of medieval conceptions of both to the very different
conceptual understandings of law and the State. Those debates remain
current, but under a constantly changing contextual landscape. Since the
sixteenth century, debates about the meaning of both have gone hand in
hand with the almost simultaneous construction of both the most
advanced democratic constitutional States and the most authoritarian
States of the twentieth century. Contemporaneously, they serve as the
building blocks of both political and economic regulatory networks at the
supra-national level.
14. See, e.g., Parthapratim Chanda, The Effectiveness of The World Bank's AntiCorruptionEfforts: CurrentLegal and Structural Obstacles and Uncertainties,32 DENV.
J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 315 (2004).
15. See CHARLES MCILWAIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, ANCIENT AND MODERN (Ithaca,

N.Y., Cornell U. Press, rev. ed. 1947).
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Those debates have taken on greater meaning with the advent of
globalization and the elaboration of transnational systems of governance.
Gubernaculum and jurisdictio serve as the basis for both making an
object of law distinct from its origins and for understanding the
parameters of its "rule." Law as an object can be transported, adopted,
moved, and negotiated detached from any particular government or
individual can serve as a powerful transnational force and also a limit on
the power of individuals or institutions to subvert it. As evidence of
governmental will, however, it may be far more parochial. These
differences become critical as the world moves toward systems of
coercive global law, understood either as common law binding on States,
as the precursor to global governance institutions like the International
Criminal Court, 16 or global private law systems based on contracts with
public law characteristics. 17 But its jurisprudential expression, especially
since the mania for positivism in the construction of political
"constitutional" societies took hold in the nineteenth century,' 8 produced
a certain amnesia of sorts of the ancient, and often violent, contests over
the nature of law and the relationship of law to government. 19
This symposium explores these dynamic aspects of the relationship
of law, State, and government in a national, international comparative,
and transnational context. Contributors examine the issues from a
variety of perspectives. These perspectives range from theoretical to
applied frameworks-that is, from a set of concepts to methods of
implementation. Law and governance now appear in new forms, and old
forms take on new meanings within theory and as applied. The goal is to
develop a more complex and realistic structure for understanding law and
regulation in a globalized environment in which the traditional nationstate no longer can claim a monopoly of formal or informal power to
create or enforce norms. The "idea" of law acquires distinct meanings in
a global system in which multiple sources of law-States, corporations,
religious institutions, and other non-governmental communities16.
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A/CONF. 183/9th (July 12, 1999).

17. See, e.g., Errol Meidinger, Multi-Interest Self Governance Through Global
Product CertificationPrograms (Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 2006016, U. of Buffalo Law School Baldy Center for Law and Social Policy), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract-917956 (last visited Jan. 16, 2008).
18. See PHILIP ALCOTT, THE HEALTH OF NATIONS: SOCIETY AND LAW BEYOND THE
STATE 47 (Cambridge, Cambridge U. Press 2002) (on English positivism); William P.
LaPiana, Swift v. Tyson and the Brooding Omnipresence in the Sky: An Investigation of
the Idea of Law in Antebellum America, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 775-76 (1986).
19. On both the medieval forbearers of pre-Enlightenment conceptions of law and
the legal order, the relationships between public and private law, see PAOLO GROSSI,
MITOLOGiAS JURiDICAS DA MODERNIDADE (Florian6polis, Brasil, Fundagdo Boiteux
2004).
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compete for authority and in which neither the state, nor its government
can always command a privileged position.
The contributors have chosen to explore these complex interactions
from the perspectives of both theory and practice. They have approached
the issues from its roots in national as well as international governance.
Together, they provide a glimpse of the complexities of modern
jurisprudence in its transnational context. My contribution to this
symposium seeks to confront the issue of the character of law and its
ramifications for the power of the State. 20 The Article interrogates that
discourse in modern terms. Using the gubernaculum and jurisdictio
distinction in Bracton, the Article focuses on Francis Bacon's defense of
James I/VI's instrumentalist view of law and Edward Coke's organic
view of law as the embodiment of the normative values of the political
community that serves to bind and limit its government. These opposing
visions of law are then explored in the context of the jurisprudential
oppositions of nineteenth and twentieth century political theory. Then,
more broadly, the Article examines the Bacon-Coke opposition in postmodern and global terms. The Article suggests the way in which the
constitutional deadlock of seventeenth century England, now broadened
and freed of the artificial boundaries between public and private law,
reproduces itself on a global level in the twenty-first century. To that
end the Article explores the way in which the contested understanding of
law as object or subject becomes a critical element in the management of
networks of power at the international global level and in the
reconstitution of legal reification in global common law and private
transnational legal systems. The analysis ends with an exploration of the
implications of these theories in the construction of modern transnational
constitutionalism, both secular and theocratic.
Gunnar Beck 21 examines another aspect of law and its relationship
to government. He argues that customary common law, or ethically or
religiously grounded models of the individual, ultimately provides a
more convincing framework for restraining gubernaculum. In the
absence of such a firm ethical or religious foundation, judicial lawmaking lacks foundational solidity. For Beck, it is unclear whether such
a foundation can still be provided in the absence of a unifying normative
or social framework or whether, ultimately, in modern times the only
credible reason for dividing law-making authority between different
agencies is merely functional. But a privileging of separation and

20. Larry Catd Backer, Reifying Law: Understanding Law Beyond the State, 26
PENN ST. INT'L L. REv. 521 (Winter 2008).
21. Gunnar Beck, Legimation Crisis, Reifying Human Rights and the Norm-Creating
Power of the Factual,26 PENN ST. INT'L L. REV. 565 (Winter 2008).
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diffusion of power principles in the absence of a consensus-based
understanding of organizational first principles also poses a legitimation
problem. This legitimation problem becomes more acute with respect to
first principles expressing communal values. These effects produce
consequences that are at once significant but also partial. Their effects
cannot be appreciated apart from the concentration of power in private
hands, which is not subject to institutional checks and balances. Beck
also interrogates the way in which law is redefining itself in the postnational context. What is clear is that in this international system the
usual explanatory devices, such as the rule of recognition, no longer
provide adequate means for analyzing the sources of the specific forms
of authority. Neither do they serve as a useful basis for analyzing issues
of legitimacy that law lends to politics, nor for understanding the scope,
source and limits of legal power. But here one meets a problem of
source. Law tied to the apparatus of any state, for all its defects, has the
benefit of clearly defined lines of authority. In a world of diffuse and
private lawmaking, the problem of legitimacy and authority becomes the
central issue for law. Consequentially, it becomes difficult to define the
manner in which private gubernaculum is or can still be restrained
throughjurisdictio. Perhaps, Beck suggests, there are no answers except
that the term "Business Law" will acquire a new and all-embracing
importance.
Mark Modak-Truran's contribution2 2 begins bridging theory and
implementation. His context is the relationship of state and law in China.
Modak-Truron asks:
Is it meaningful to continue talking about the rule of law? Does legal
indeterminacy and the ontological gap mean that law is primarily
guided by local social norms and customs rather than universal rules
and principles? Do different cultural circumstances in the West and
the East warrant different conceptions of the rule of law? If so, can a
normative theory of law legitimate these culturally
sensitive
23
conceptions without devolving into cultural relativism?
He applies the post-modern normative theory of law based on the
Process Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead and the Radical
Empiricism of William James to address these issues. The result is a
"process theory of natural law" that he argues provides a novel theory of
natural law that eliminates the perceived illegitimacy arising from legal
indeterminacy, and closes the ontological gap between legal theory and
practice. He also argues that a process theory of natural law mediates
22. Mark Modak-Truran, A Process Theory of Natural Law and the Rule of Law in
China, 26 PENN ST. INT'L L. REv. 607 (Winter 2008).
23. Id. at 610.
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many of the cultural differences between the East and the West through
the telos of beauty (unity-in-diversity), which entails maximizing both an
Eastern aesthetic sense of order (emergent harmony or spontaneous
order) and a Western rational sense of order (complexity arising from
diverse individual orderings). This conception of the rule of law allows
for important cultural differences to be reflected in the interpretation of
democracy and formal legality and in the instantiation of individual
rights in the law. From this he concludes that the ideal rule of law may
look different in the United States and China, and may continue to
evolve in our constantly changing, pluralistic, and multicultural world.
Jose Gabilondo 24 directly confronts the implementation issues raised
in Backer and Beck's contributions. He examines a legal and policy
discourse about the need to reduce the transaction costs of worker
remittances. The issue has become more important as labor migration
has led to surges of remittance flows, which have become a source of
hard currency foreign financing to developing countries on par with
official aid and foreign direct investment. He argues that the current
discourse on the question reflects a convergence of economic interests of
three constituencies:
labor-exporting countries, labor-importing
countries, and international financial organizations, like the World Bank
and the Inter-American Development Bank. The conflict between these
constituencies and the interests of diaspora workers themselves illustrates
one of the governance dilemmas about conflict and renegotiation of the
relationship between ethnos, law, and the State raised by Backer and
Beck.
Mae Kuykendal1 25 approaches the issue from the opposite end of the
analytic spectrum. She focuses on the corporation as a site of regulation.
The corporation is a fluid entity dominated by the logic of investment, a
logic disjoined from the human stories that exist within corporations and
which are rendered irrelevant to the subject of corporate law by the
dominant persona of the corporate entity. It is not clear that this feature
of the corporation, which naturally arises from the logic of financial
markets, displaces law so much as, with growth of global capital, it
makes less accessible to political understanding more sectors of human
experience in which law might seek a role. The corporation is a site, not
ofjurisdictio or gubernaculum,but of fleeting interconnections based on
exchange, all embedded in a whirlwind of words, and defying reification.
Hence, it may be possible to suggest that law itself may not be contained.

24. Jos& Gabilondo, Monetizing Diaspora: Liquid Sovereigns and the Interest
Convergence Around Worker Remittances, 26 PENN ST. INT'L L. REv. 653 (Winter 2008).
25. Mae Kuykendall, The Ship of State and the Abandoned Yacht, 26 PENN ST. INT'L
L. REv. 673 (Winter 2008).
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As such, no community of actors seeking to assert regulatory authority
can assert a monopoly of power. Though the state, for example, may
wrest a monopoly for formal law making power from diverse regulatory
communities (religion, social groups, economic organizations and the
like), it is unlikely to be able to control all regulatory authority. The
contemporary world in general, and globalization in particular, may best
be characterized by a diffusion of power, and thus of law. This is
especially the case in the contemporary world, where soft law and nonpolitical governance frameworks have become an important part of the
network of systems regulating individual and collective conduct. For
regulatory institutions-like States and corporations-this suggests a
limit to the resort to law to effect change, or control.
Carolina Pancotto Bohrer Munhoz 26 ends the dialogue with an
examination of law detached from its moorings in the state and its
governance apparatus. She interrogates the complexity of corruption and
the search for definition and methodological consensus at the
transnational level. The specific objective is to identify the notion of
corruption adopted by the World Bank in an attempt to demonstrate in
what way this notion affects the actions of the institution in its fight
against corruption and in the promotion of its primary objectives. In
order to reach this objective, the adopted concept of corruption is
analyzed in different contexts, both national and international. The
Article discusses the concept of corruption adopted by the World Bank,
and the implication of this for the actions of the institution. The Article
analyzes the relationship that the preponderant role of the fight against
corruption as an instrument of promoting development has with the
paradigm of development adopted by the World Bank today, known as
the Comprehensive Development Framework. However, this interest
does not translate into a consensus on a single definition of corruption, or
about the phenomena that it entails. In fact, there is no universally
accepted concept of corruption. Because of this, practices understood or
interpreted as being corrupt in one jurisdiction might not be judged
corrupt in another.
Taken together, these Articles suggest the realities of a world
political, economic and social order in which the only stable element is
the use of the same set of words to hide a multitude of ideas, desires,
normative and institutional frameworks. Yet the Articles also suggest a
fairly narrow range within which the great debates over communal
orderings are taking place. The Articles further suggest that those

26. Carolina Pancotto Bohrer Munhoz, CorruptionIn the Eyes of The World Bank:
Implicationsfor the Institution's Policies and Developing Countries, 26 PENN ST. INT'L
L. REv. 691 (Winter 2008).
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debates are no longer the sole province of traditional, politically
constituted states, or even of political entities, but have become the
common thread in the rush to institutionalize governance at the level of
the firm, the political party, the state and the community of States. Law
is a protean concept: it is at its most useful when it can serve as the
object of desire of those who wish to use it. It has served totalitarian
States as well as multinational corporations. It has been as much the
creature of customary law in England as it has been instrumental in the
ordering of systems of customary law at the international level. Law is
both synonymous with the State, and the only means by which the State
can be contained. It is a tool of political governance and the framework
through which the state can be overcome. The "rule" of law is thus
reduced to a highly technical meaning-the means through which
arbitrary governance is contained-or it can be understood in a broader
sense to encompass the institutionalization of governance at any level of
autonomous, self-contained governance systems.2 7 Yet, the result is not
that the term "rule of law" loses all meaning, but that it serves as the
vessel through which the commonalities of governance systems can be
understood, compared, and tested for their authority and legitimacy in the
context of their creation and operation. As international public and
private law systems are broadened and deepened in this century, an
understanding of the meaning and application of law in these senses will
serve as a foundation for analysis and judgment of the value of the
resulting systems of law.

27. Gunther Teubner, Societal Constitutionalism: Alternatives to State-Centered
Constitutional Theory, in TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 3-28
(Christian Joerges, Inger-Johane Sand and Gunther Teubner eds., Oxford & Portland,
Oregon, Hart Publishing 2004).

